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Abstract. Much of the world's critical infrastructure is at risk from attack 
through electronic networks connected to control systems. Security metrics are 
important because they provide the basis for management decisions that affect 
the protection of the infrastructure. A cyber security technical metric is the 
security relevant output from an explicit mathematical model that makes use of 
objective measurements of a technical object. A specific set of technical 
security metrics are proposed for use by the operators of control systems. Our 
proposed metrics are based on seven security ideals associated with seven 
corresponding abstract dimensions of security. We have defined at least one 
metric for each of the seven ideals. Each metric is a measure of how nearly the 
associated ideal has been achieved. These seven ideals provide a useful 
structure for further metrics development. A case study shows how the 
proposed metrics can be applied to an operational control system.  
Keywords: Cyber Security Metrics, Control System Security. 
1   Introduction 
Electronic control systems are used to operate much of the world's critical 
infrastructure and are increasingly connected to public networks. Therefore, control 
systems and the associated critical infrastructure are at risk from cyber attacks. 
Examples of critical infrastructures that may be at risk from cyber attack are power 
plants, chemical processing plants, rail and air transportation, oil and gas facilities, 
etc. The security of a control system (or of any electronic network) is difficult to 
quantify. Meaningful metrics are needed to make informed decisions that affect 
system security. 
A metric is a standard of measurement. The goal of metrics is to quantify data to 
facilitate insight [5]. It is important which metrics are chosen because good metrics 
lead to good decisions and bad metrics lead to bad decisions. The scope of this paper 
is limited to quantitative technical metrics. A cyber security technical metric is the 
security relevant output from an explicit mathematical model that makes use of 
objective measurements of a technical object. Other types of metrics (such as 
operational and organizational metrics and metrics that are qualitative such as "low 
impact" or "highly unlikely") can provide insights about security but are beyond the 
scope of this work.  
The overarching goal of technical metrics is the estimation of risk where risk is 
defined as the probability of an event times the consequence of the event. Security 
risk is generally stated as equal to the Threat times Vulnerability times Consequence. 
The risk we would like to measure is the expected value of the loss from cyber attacks 
per unit time. The estimation of risk could provide the ability to weigh the benefits 
versus costs of security counter measures.  
Previous work [6] proposed "mean time-to-compromise" as a security metric and 
proposed a simple method for calculating it as a function of the number of known 
vulnerabilities. A method was also proposed for estimating risk reduction for a simple 
control system using the mean time-to-compromise metric [7]. However, those 
methods require simplifying assumptions that are not valid in general. A credible 
estimation of cyber security risk in real world control systems is not currently feasible 
because the problem involves an unpredictable intelligent adversary and very 
complex systems. The metrics we propose in this paper are intended to support the 
concept of risk measurement within the practical constraints of what is currently 
objectively measurable and what is potentially under the control of the defender. A 
good set of metrics should have the following attributes: The number of metrics 
should be small (less than 20) to be manageable; the metrics should be easy to 
understand, measurable and objective; the metrics should be directly related to 
security risk; and the set of metrics should represent the most important measurable 
security attributes of the system. 
2 Initial security metrics investigation 
Thirty guides and standards documents (including, for example, references [2], [3], 
[12], [13]) were reviewed in search of technical metrics that have previously been 
defined and recommended [4]. A sampling of security metrics used by some 
industries were also included in the investigation. Most of the metrics found in the 
standards and guides do not meet our definition of a technical metric. We found no 
case where a standards document recommended the use of a specific metric or set of 
metrics.  
We evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the few identified technical metrics 
and concluded that existing metrics have serious weaknesses. For example, many of 
the metrics were simply a percent of the system components that implemented a 
certain type of security control mechanism. But the fractional implementation of a 
given security mechanism does not necessarily correlate to risk. A specific metric 
defined in industry is "Average number of vulnerabilities per system component". 
This metric has the following strengths. It is easy to understand and it easy to obtain 
estimates by automatic scanning tools. But the problem of using an average is that all 
vulnerabilities and all components of the network are given equal weight. Consider 
the case where there is one easily exploitable vulnerability that allows penetration of a 
critical system component while there are zero known vulnerabilities on the other 
system components. Now consider a case where there are no known vulnerabilities on 
critical components, no vulnerabilities that allow penetration from an external site, but 
there are many minor vulnerabilities on non-critical system components. The former 
case is a high-risk situation, but the metric indicates low risk while the latter case is a 
low-risk situation, but the metric indicates high risk. This metric has a built in 
assumption that all vulnerabilities and all components are of approximately equal 
value. The assumption is false for most systems. The metric can be improved by 
averaging the number of vulnerabilities for each group of components with similar 
security implications and for vulnerabilities with similar effects (i.e., external 
penetration versus privilege escalation). The results of our investigation of existing 
metrics showed the need for the definition of a small set of technical metrics that 
operators of control systems can use to gain better insight into their security risk. 
3 Approach 
The measurement of risk is the overarching goal of security metrics but is currently 
highly subjective. Since a credible estimate of risk is not feasible, we suggest a set of 
ideals to guide the 
development of a set of 
objective measurements that 
can provide decision makers 
with improved insights about 
security risk. 
3.1. Seven ideals of security 
Seven ideals are the basis 
for our proposed metrics. 
Each ideal is associated with 
an abstract dimension of 
security and represents a 
system condition at a given 
point in time such that 
perfection has been achieved 
for its associated dimension 
of security. The seven 
dimensions of security and 
the respective ideals are 
listed in Table 1. We chose the ideals in Table 1 based on our study and experience in 
the cyber security field and suggest that each of these ideals is strongly related to 
security risk. 
Table 1. Seven abstract dimensions of security 
and associated ideals 
Security 
Dimension Ideal 
1. Security Group 
(SG) knowledge 
1. Security Group (SG) 
knows current system 
perfectly. 
2. Attack Group 
(AG) knowledge 
2. Attack Group (AG) 
knows nothing about the 
system. 
3. Access 3. System is inaccessible to 
AGs 
4. Vulnerabilities 4. The system has no 
vulnerabilities 
5. Damage 
potential 
5. The system can’t be 
damaged  
6. Detection 6. SG detects any 
compromise instantly. 
7. Recovery 7. SG can restore system 
integrity instantly. 
 
3.2. Security principles 
It is well known that the purpose of computer security is the protection of 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of computer systems. Security principles 
support that purpose. We assert that our seven security ideals are consistent with 
generally accepted security principles. To support that assertion we successfully 
mapped security principles from Bishop [1], Neumann [10], Schneier [14], NIST [16] 
and Summers [17] to our seven ideals.  
 
To help identify a useful set of technical metrics we suggest the following set of 
principles that are organized by and directly applicable to our seven abstract 
dimensions of security.  
  
1. Security Group (SG) knowledge principles 
a. The system configuration should not be changed without the security group's 
knowledge. 
b. The system should be thoroughly tested and regularly monitored for 
vulnerabilities. 
2. Attack Group knowledge principles 
a. Credential keys (e.g. passwords) should be strong, should not be disclosed 
and should be changed regularly. 
b. The system should send no unencrypted information through external 
networks or respond to any user/application/machine that has not previously 
been authenticated. 
c. Information about the system design, implementation or configuration should 
not be made public. 
3. Access principles 
a. Number of external communication paths should be minimized; including 
network connections, TCP/IP ports/services, physical access to USB ports and 
portable storage media drives. 
b. Compartmentalization. The system should be divided into loosely coupled 
parts. This principle improves security because if one part is compromised, 
the damage to the rest of the system is limited. This principle avoids total loss 
from a single point of failure. The principle includes the precept of least 
privilege. 
c. Defense in depth. The system should be designed and configured such that an 
attack can succeed only by breaking through a series of independent barriers.  
4.  Vulnerability principles 
a. The time between vulnerability discovery and repair should be small. 
b. Complexity implies unknown vulnerabilities. 
c. Fix high-priority vulnerabilities first, with priority on vulnerabilities that can 
be exploited from the perimeter and that allow penetration. 
5. Damage potential principle 
a. Mechanisms that are independent of the control system should provide 
protection such that the cost of damage due to control system malicious 
behavior is minimized. 
6. Detection principles 
a. The system should be constantly monitored for malicious behavior and alarms 
should be raised when detected. 
b. The malicious behavior detection mechanisms must not have false positive 
rates that exceed the ability of the SG to process, even if this results in some 
malicious behaviors going undetected. 
7. Recovery principles 
a. Several previous versions of system data should be saved regularly and 
protected from deliberate or accidental loss, such that in the event of 
compromise, a previous version can be chosen that is not likely to be 
corrupted. 
b. The time needed to restore the system with a previous uncorrupted version 
should be small. 
4. Proposed set of metrics  
Our proposed metrics are 
based on the seven security 
ideals listed in Table 1. We 
propose at least one metric 
for each of the seven ideals 
as shown in Table 2.  Each 
defined metric is intended to 
answer the question "what 
can be objectively measured 
on the system that is a 
reasonable representation of 
how nearly the ideal has 
been realized?" The 
following sections briefly 
discuss each of our proposed 
metrics. 
 
Rogue Change Days is 
the number of rogue changes 
multiplied by number of days 
the changes were unknown 
to the Security Group (SG). 
A rogue change is any 
change to the system 
configuration without prior 
notification to the SG. 
A key assertion is that the 
security risk from changes to 
the system without 
notification to the security 
Table 2. Proposed metrics 
Security Ideal  Metric            Principle 
Rogue change days  1a 1. Security Group 
(SG) knows 
current system 
perfectly. 
Component test count 1b 
Minimum password 
strength  
2a 2. Attack Group 
(AG) knows 
nothing about the 
system. 
Data transmission 
exposure  
2b 
Reachability count 3a 
Root privilege count  3b 
3. System is 
inaccessible to 
AGs 
Defense depth 3c 
Vulnerability exposure 4a 4. The system has 
no vulnerabilities Attack surface 4b 
5. The system 
can’t be damaged  
Worst case loss  5a 
Detection mechanism 
deficiency count 
6a 6. SG detects any 
compromise 
instantly. Detection performance 6b 
7. SG can restore 
system integrity 
instantly. 
Restoration time 7b 
 
group is, on average, worse than for changes which are announced in a well managed 
system.  
This metric is a valid worst case measure of the quantity of potentially security 
impacting changes. One weakness of this metric is that it does not include any 
measure of the actual security impact of changes. 
For this metric the set of objects under change control must first be established and 
a version identifier must be saved for each object to establish a baseline. Periodically 
the current version identifier is scanned and compared to the previously saved 
identifier. Examples of objects under configuration management are: PLCs, HMIs, 
critical computer files, network devices attached to the local network, etc. 
Each type of configured object must have an associated mechanism for 
identification that produces an identifier that an audit program can obtain from the 
object. For example, computer files may have a hash function applied to the file 
content to calculate an identifier that can be used to determine if the file has changed.  
Mathematical formula: 
ST == An ordered set of version identifiers for all configured objects, measured at 
time T. 
ST+k == An ordered set of version identifiers for all configured objects, measured at 
time T + k.  
TSCT+k == Number of mismatches between sets ST and ST+k 
CCT+k == Changes introduced into the system only after notification of the security 
group, 
RCT+k == TSCT+k - CCT+k is the number of Rogue Changes between the current 
measurement of the system and the previous measurement of the system. 
 
Rogue Change Days  ==  RCT+k * k 
 
Component Test Count  is the number of control system components that have 
not undergone independent security testing. This metric is included in our proposed 
set because we recognize the importance of security testing. A key assertion is that 
independent security testing of the system components will reduce risk. 
An independent test is one that is performed by personnel that are not under the 
direct employ of the vendor. An unresolved question: Do tests become obsolete with 
the passage of time or when there is a new version of the component? If so, then how 
do you determine when the tests are obsolete? 
 
Minimum password strength is the shortest time (in days) needed to crack a 
single password for any account on the system. 
Key assertions are that passwords are the most critical information to protect on the 
system and the system security tends to improve when minimum password strength 
increases.  This metric is a valid measure of the minimum amount of time an attacker 
would need to compromise the system by password cracking. The password age 
should be subtracted from the password cracking time. One weakness of this metric is 
that it does not measure the strength of other authentication mechanisms but 
passwords are the most common form of authentication. 
Data collected for this metric is the encrypted password files from all machines on 
the system. For example, all password files from UNIX servers, Configuration data 
for Web Servers, Database Servers, Windows workstations, Control System HMI, etc. 
A password cracking tool is then applied to each password file instance. The metric is 
simply the minimum time needed to crack a single password. 
Password cracking tools are available commercially and for free download. Data 
should be collected whenever passwords change. This metric is an important measure 
because passwords (digital private keys) are by far the most common form of 
authentication. The value of the metric should be greater than the password expiration 
time. This metric is independent of password policies because it measures the least 
amount of time an attacker would need to crack a password if the encrypted password 
data is available to the attacker. If a very weak password is used, (including a default 
vendor supplied password) an attacker can guess the password without obtaining the 
encrypted password files and this metric would detect that high risk situation because 
good password cracking tools crack very weak passwords virtually instantly. 
Passwords used for authentication at the perimeter are particularly important and 
therefore perhaps should be measured for strength separately from other passwords 
used on the system. The security manager should ensure that vendor supplied 
passwords and passwords commonly used by maintenance personnel are included in 
the password cracker's dictionary. 
 
Data transmission exposure is the unencrypted data transmission volume. A key 
assertion is that any data that can be monitored by a potential attacker increases the 
security risk. Some data is clearly more sensitive than others but to make the metric 
simple to obtain we propose that this metric be a count of the number of unencrypted 
machine communication channel pairs in use. For a TCP/IP network, it is the number 
of unencrypted machine TCP-port pairs in use (as observable by network monitoring). 
Some network paths are more critical than others but during a multi-stage attack, an 
attacker may gain access to an internal network by first penetrating the system 
through an external network path. The security manager may choose to categorize 
network connections (e.g. publicly accessible, internal) and track this metric for each 
network category.  
 
Reachability count is the number of access points (relative to a specific point of 
origin such as the Internet). A key assertion is that a reduction in the number of access 
points tends to reduce the cyber security risk. 
This metric requires complete network configuration information including 
connectivity and firewall rules. It also requires information about physical access to 
computer ports. The system may be scanned to identify all network communication 
paths. Physical access to portable storage media drives can be done by inspection. 
Mathematical model: 
Ns == Number of ports (services) that respond to data transmitted from the point 
of origin.  
No == Number of machines that have network connectivity from inside the 
network to the point of origin. Connectivity means the network 
configuration allows the machine to originate two-way connection-
oriented sessions to some facility located at the point of origin. (Note: 
strict one-way outgoing data transmission is OK) 
Np == Number of physical access points to unrestricted portable storage media 
drives. 
NT == Total reachability count 
 
NT = Ns + No + Np 
 
The security manager may choose to combine the network and physical 
reachability counts or track them separately.  
Because of the possibility of penetration of the perimeter the security manager may 
choose to calculate this metric at multiple points of origin within the network 
perimeter such as at the DMZ, or behind each firewall. The measurement of reachable 
ports/services includes all the cases of crafted packets that exploit known 
vulnerabilities in firewalls and routers, such as the spoofing of IP addresses and 
packet fragmentation to disguise the targeted TCP port number.  
The point of origin for physical access may be "outside the fence" or some other 
partially controlled area or combination of areas within the fence as defined by the 
security manager. Examples of restricted portable storage media drives that should 
not be included in the count of physical access points are: 
• USB ports that are disconnected or physically disabled. 
• Host-based or device-based port encryption. 
• Ports restricted by end-point control software. 
 
Root privilege count is the number of unique user IDs with administration (root) 
access privilege. A key assertion is that risk is strongly related to the principle of least 
privilege. This metric is a simple measure of how well this principle is being 
followed. 
 
Defense depth the minimum number of independent single machine compromises 
required for a successful network attack. This metric emphasizes the need to avoid a 
protection configuration that can be defeated by a single point of failure. There may 
be common vulnerabilities on various paths of entry, therefore the attack steps may 
not be truly independent and this metric may be optimistic. To calculate this metric 
detailed network configuration data is needed such that each machine in the system 
can be determined to be reachable or not reachable from every other machine and 
every network access point in the system. A machine is defined to be reachable from 
a point of origin if at least one service responds to data transmitted from that point.  
Mathematical model: 
Defense Depth == Minimum number of compromises required to reach any 
machine in the set S from the public network by traversing network paths. S is the set 
of machines such that if any machine in the set is compromised then the attack is 
considered to be successful. 
 
Vulnerability exposure is the sum of known and unpatched vulnerabilities, each 
multiplied by their exposure time interval. It is measured in vulnerability days. A key 
assertion is that the longer a vulnerability is open the greater the risk it will be 
exploited. 
Mathematical model:  
N = Number of open known vulnerabilities that apply to the system. 
Ti = Discovery date of vulnerability i 
t = current date 
T == Total vulnerability days 

=
−=
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 For publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, the discovery date is the disclosure date 
from the public vulnerability database. For vulnerabilities that are discovered locally, 
such as configuration errors, it is the local discovery date. Vulnerabilities that apply to 
the system may be identified by vulnerability test tools and by comparing system 
components to the components associated with publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. 
The system should be scanned for vulnerabilities often (suggest weekly or when 
there is a known configuration change). Public vulnerability databases should be 
checked regularly and often (suggest daily). This metric is affected by vulnerability 
discovery rate and by patch rate. Vulnerabilities may result from design errors, 
implementation errors and from mis-configurations such as inappropriate trusted 
relationships between machines. Some vulnerabilities are more significant than 
others. Tools such as Attack Graphs [11] can be used to determine priority categories 
for all known vulnerabilities. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
[15] is another suggested mechanism for prioritizing known vulnerabilities. This 
metric could be applied separately for each vulnerability category. 
 
Attack surface is a measure of potential vulnerability. Key assertions are 1) 
vulnerabilities exist that are currently unknown to the defender and 2) the attack 
surface complexity, including external interfaces is strongly correlated to the potential 
for the discovery of new vulnerabilities. 
Attack surface has been proposed as a security metric by Manadhata and Wing [9]. 
This metric is considered to be potentially very valuable but is not yet sufficiently 
developed to be used in practice.  
 
Worst case loss is the maximum dollar value of the damage/loss that could be 
inflicted by malicious personnel via a compromised control system. 
A key assertion is that the risk is strongly related to the worst case loss. Although 
there can be successful attacks where the actual loss is much less than worst case, we 
assert that a reduction in the worst case loss reduces the potential for loss and 
therefore reduces risk. The worst case loss can probably be estimated from an existing 
safety analysis associated with the plant. The metric is the answer to the question "If 
the control system is under the control of a malicious person, what damage can be 
done?". Safety systems that prevent serious damage should be completely 
independent of the control system. 
 
Detection mechanism deficiency count is the number of externally accessible 
devices without any malware/attack detection mechanisms. A key assertion is that 
detection mechanisms reduce risk especially when applied to devices that can be used 
as entry points for attacks.  
 
Detection performance is a measure of the effectiveness of the detection 
mechanisms (intrusion detection system, anti-virus software, etc.) implemented on the 
system. The metric can be defined as detection probability discounted by false alarm 
rate. 
The metric should be applied separately to each of the detection mechanisms used 
on the system. 
A suggested mathematical model: 
N = Number of attack test cases  
D = Number of attack test cases detected 
Pd = D/N = Probability of detection. 
F = Number of false alarms during tests.  
Pfa = F/(D + F) = Probability of false alarm. 
 
Detection Performance = Pd * (1 – Pfa) 
 
This metric is difficult to obtain currently but is theoretically measurable. There is 
some public data available but better tests and tools are needed. Some intrusion 
detection products have been evaluated by Lincoln Laboratories [8]. 
 
Restoration time is the worst case elapsed time to restore the system to a known 
uncorrupted version. The metric can be determined by measuring the actual time 
elapsed from "start" to a fully restored and 100% operational system. If it is 
impractical to perform that kind of a test on an operational system then this data 
should be collected for actual security events if they have occurred. If a recovery test 
is not feasible, then a worst case recovery analysis may be used to estimate recovery 
time. 
T0 = Start time (Time compromise is detected, or test start time) 
Tr = Time at which recovery is complete and the system is 100% operational. 
Restoration time =  Maximum value of all instances of (Tr  -T0) 
5. Case Study  
Our proposed security 
metrics were applied to a 
case study of a Distributed 
Control System (DCS) for 
a chemical processing 
plant. Figure 1 is a 
simplified network 
diagram of the case study 
system. Notice that the 
system is connected to the 
Internet through the 
corporate network. The 
Fig. 1. Case study control system network diagram 
 
corporate
network Internet
router
TCP/IP network
control network
controllers
Chemical process
System boundary
Plant data
archive
dedicated
Telephone
line
…
…
router that provides connectivity between the corporate network and the local TCP/IP 
network restricts access to the control system with an access-control-list so only the 
incoming TCP/IP connections with origination addresses that match the control list 
are allowed through the router. The system boundary was defined to be the processing 
plant and the control system networks that are within the control room. The corporate 
network affects the security of the control system but for this study the corporate 
network was not considered to be part of the system. 
 
The DCS for this case 
study consists of a TCP/IP 
network that provides 
connectivity for 11 
workstations and 2 printers, 
and a proprietary control 
network that provides 
connectivity to 
approximately 30 
distributed controller nodes 
that control and monitor the 
plant. The workstations on 
the TCP/IP network consist 
of standard IT hardware, 
standard IT operating 
system software and 
application software 
supplied by the DCS 
vendor. The controller 
nodes consist of specialized 
control hardware and 
software supplied by the 
same DCS vendor. 
5.1. Metrics not included 
in the case study 
The values of the following proposed metrics were not obtained for the case study. 
Not surprisingly, the attempt to determine the values of these metrics showed that 
these metrics are difficult to measure. These metrics are currently impractical, but 
remain in the proposed set because they are theoretically measurable and may become 
practical in the future as more advanced tools are developed.  
• Component Test Count 
• Attack Surface 
• Detection Performance. 
Table 3. Case study metrics values 
Metric Name Metric 
Value 
Ideal 
target 
value 
Suggested 
target 
value 
Rogue Change Days 0 0 0 
Minimum Password 
Strength 
> 30 
days 
 >30 days 
Data Transmission 
Exposure 
23 0 1 
Reachability Count 
(NT)* 
164 0 1 
   Physical (Np) 2 0 0 
   Services (NS) 149 0 1 
   Outgoing (No) 13 0 0 
Root Privilege Count 3 0 1 
Defense Depth 2  4 
Worst Case Loss $100M $0 ? 
Detection Mechanism 
Deficiency Count 
12 0 0 
Vulnerability 
Exposure             
(high priority) 
16,416 
vuln. 
days 
0 0  
Vulnerability 
Exposure              
(low priority) 
15,877 
vuln. 
days 
0 0 
Restoration Time 120  
minutes 
0 120 
minutes 
 
*NT = Np + NS + No 
5.2 Case study metrics values 
The metric values, ideal target values and suggested target values for our case study 
are shown in Table 3. The "suggested target value" was determined by estimating 
what the value of the metric would be after making a set of suggested security 
improvements. The cost of the suggested improvements can now be weighed against 
the value the projected improvements in the metrics. Every suggested security 
improvement will result in the improvement of at least one of the recommended 
metrics. The method for obtaining each metric value and suggested security 
improvements are described below. 
 
5.2.1. Rogue Change Days The case study system has an audit mechanism that 
compares the system configuration to the official database of configured items. There 
have been no known cases of a rogue change on this control system. Therefore, the 
measured value for the metric is zero. 
The system has a configuration management plan that has identified a long list of 
configured items of many different types including all hardware and software items 
related to the options that apply to this system, such as the set of display screens, 
Control-Language Programs, Tags and history parameters. The audit program resides 
on a workstation that is located outside the system boundary. The system 
administrator runs the audit program after system configuration changes are made to 
verify that only the planned changes have taken place. The audit program could be 
fooled by a clever attacker because it primarily compares file dates to the list of 
configured item file dates. Additional tools could be used to provide more reliable 
measures of whether there have been unauthorized changes to the system. 
 
5.2.2. Minimum password strength The system did not use any default 
passwords. The age of all the passwords was 2 days. (passwords were all changed 2 
days before the case study started). The password files were copied from all 
workstations on the TCP/IP network and a freeware password cracker (John the 
Ripper) was run against the password files. The password cracker ran for 30 days 
without cracking any passwords, therefore the value of the metric is greater than 30 
days. Since the system administrator sets all passwords and uses a password policy 
that includes a minimum number of characters, the passwords for this system seems 
to be quite strong. 
 
5.2.3. Data transmission exposure The monitoring of network traffic at the router 
on the system boundary showed that several unencrypted services are used including 
DNS, remote login, print services and FTP. There are 11 machines on the local 
TCP/IP network that use the DNS service located outside the control room, 9 
machines on the TCP/IP network provide remote login and FTP services, there are 2 
printers on the TCP/IP network that provide print services to external hosts. The 
dedicated telephone line that provides data to the plant data archive was counted as 
one data transmission machine-port pair. The total number of machine-port pairs was 
23. This metric could be reduced significantly by setting up a firewall that allows no 
unencrypted traffic from the TCP/IP network to the corporate network. Needed 
services could be provided by proxy servers and encrypted services. The suggested 
target value of 1 reflects the fact that it may not be feasible to encrypt the data that 
flows to the plant data archive. 
 
5.2.4. Reachability count The network services reachability count was obtained 
by scanning the machines connected to the local TCP/IP network with the well known 
open source tool Nessus. Each unique machine type was scanned and then the total 
numbers were obtained by adding the number of reachable services on every machine 
of each type. This metric can be reduced by turning off unneeded services however it 
may be difficult to determine which services are not needed. A firewall at the control 
room boundary that allows only secure shell service to be accessed externally would 
allow this metric to be reduced to the value of one and would clearly improve the 
security. We suggest that all needed externally accessible services could be provided 
through the secure shell service by some changes in system configuration. 
The outgoing reachability count was obtained by simply counting the number of 
machines on the local TCP/IP network because there are currently no outgoing 
restrictions. We suggest that all machines should be restricted by a local firewall to 
disallow all outgoing connections. This restriction would change the metric to a value 
of zero and would clearly reduce risk from attacks that use outgoing connections such 
as access to external web sites as a pathway in.  
The physical reachability count is the number of workstations in the control room 
with unrestricted USB ports. Although the control room has 24 hour per day 
monitoring malware could be easily introduced into the control system through an 
unrestricted USB port by an unsuspecting innocent user through a thumb drive. We 
suggest restricting the USB ports which would reduce the metric to a value of zero. 
 
5.2.5. Root privilege count The number of unique user ID's with administrative 
access privilege was small (3), so this metric indicates no serious contribution to risk. 
 
5.2.6. Defense depth Although the corporate network is outside the system 
boundary it affects the value of the defense depth metric because it separates the 
control system from the public network. The minimum number of stages for a 
successful attack is two for our case study under the assumption that an attacker must 
first gain access to the corporate network and then compromise one of the machines 
on the local TCP/IP network. The engineering workstation and operator consoles are 
connected to the TCP/IP network, therefore a compromise of any of those machines 
would constitute a successful attack. We suggest that security would be improved and 
the metric value would be increased from 2 to 4 by the following actions.  
Standard security practices on corporate networks include firewalls and DMZ that 
create some network partitioning. If these practices are followed on the corporate 
network then the number of stages required for an attacker to reach the control room 
boundary will be at least 2 which would increase the metric by one. The value of the 
metric could be incremented again by making the following changes in the control 
room: The control room network could be partitioned behind a local firewall such that 
an attacker could not reach any of the critical machines directly through the TCP/IP 
network. If the communication path from the control system to the data archive were 
configured to allow only one-way outgoing data transmission, that path would be 
removed as a possible path of attack. 
 5.2.7. Vulnerability exposure All the unique machine types on the TCP/IP 
network were scanned for vulnerabilities by the Nessus tool. There are no known 
tools available that scan for vulnerabilities on the control network. The vulnerability 
scanner identified some low priority vulnerabilities that are in the public CVE 
database so the discovery times for those vulnerabilities were obtained from the CVE 
database. Some other vulnerabilities had previously been identified on the case study 
system but had not been publicly disclosed so the discovery times for those 
vulnerabilities were obtained from the date on the memorandum that described the 
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities were categorized as either high or low priority and 
the metric was calculated for each category. High priority vulnerabilities allow an 
external penetration while low priority vulnerabilities do not. If the same vulnerability 
was found on more than one machine, it was counted separately for each machine. 
Table 3 shows that the number of vulnerability days is a large number for both 
vulnerability categories. This metric clearly shows the need for action. The known 
vulnerabilities have known mitigation methods which would improve system security 
and reduce the metric value to the ideal of zero. 
 
5.2.8. Worst case loss The worst case loss for our study was estimated by the plant 
designers to be about $100M based on the costs of reconstruction, repair and lost 
production for the most extreme case of malicious behavior by the control system. 
This is significant and implies the need for some independent safety mechanisms. 
 
5.2.9. Detection mechanism deficiency count The machines that qualify as 
"externally accessible" are all the machines that have a data transmission path directly 
connected to the network located outside the control system boundary. There were 13 
machines connected directly to the router which connects to the corporate network. 
The connection to the plant data archive is also externally accessible. Therefore, the 
number of externally accessible machines is 14. Only 2 of the 14 machines have any 
malware detection. Therefore the value of the metric is 12. The value of the metric 
can be improved by reducing the number of directly accessible machines as suggested 
for improving the defense depth metric above, or by installing more detection 
mechanisms. For our case study, an ideal value of zero is achievable. 
 
5.2.10. Restoration Time The restoration time for our case study system has been 
measured during normal preventive maintenance activities. Reboot time for the entire 
system was measured at the time of new software installation to be 120 minutes. This 
time is limited by the system architecture.  
6. Conclusions  
Because of the complexity of networked control systems and the unpredictable nature 
of intelligent adversaries, a credible quantitative measure of security risk is not 
currently feasible. However, the seven security ideals provide a useful structure for 
thinking about security and for further development of technical security metrics. A 
well chosen set of metrics can help the security managers make better decisions that 
will lead to real security improvements. The specific metrics proposed here provide a 
small and manageable set that may be refined and expanded while they encourage 
management decisions that tend to reduce the risk of a successful cyber attack on 
control systems. The definition of the proposed metrics has identified the need for 
improved measurement tools. A case study that applied many of the proposed metrics 
to a real control system showed that recommended security improvements correspond 
to improvements in the values of one or more of the proposed metrics. 
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